Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating a commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. For example, the commodity is a project requiring a certain number of hours of labor. One hour of labor is either in nitely divisible (the continuous model) or indivisible (the discrete model). Sprumont (1991) is the paper that originated a number of axiomatic studies in the continuous model over the past ten years. Recently, Moulin (1999) introduces a new class of rules, called xed-path rationing methods, and characterizes them by e ciency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity. 1 His theorem applies to both the continuous and the discrete model. The purpose of this note is to give a straightforward proof of his result.
The Model and the Result
Our formulation allows variations in the population and in the collective e n d o wment.
There is a nite set N = f1 : : : n 0 g of potential agents. 2 Let Z denote the set of all (possible) endowments. The set Z is either R + or N f 0g. When Z = R + , w e speak of the continuous model, and when Z = N f 0g, we speak of the discrete model. For each agent i 2 N there is an a priori xed maximal consumption, denoted by X i 2 Z nf0g. Given X i 2 Z nf0g, agent i's consumption set is 0 A collective endowment of a commodity has to be allocated among a nite set of agents. We allow the set of agents to be any ( nite) subset N N . Let 2 Z denote the endowment. Given N N, a (preference) pro le R is a list (R i ) i2N such that for all i 2 N, R i 2 R i . Let R N denote the set of all pro les for N. Given R 2 R N , let p(R) (p(R i )) i2N . Given S N N and R 2 R N , let R S (R i ) i2S denote the restriction of R to S. Given N N , a n economy is a pair (R ) A xed-path rationing method (Moulin, 1999 ) relies on two xed monotonic paths in the box i2N 0 X i ]. For economies in excess demand, individual consumptions are computed along the rst path, except that an agent whose demand is below his pathconsumption receives exactly his demand. We apply a similar procedure for economies in excess supply by using the other path. We refer to Moulin (1999) for additional discussion. Moulin (1999) characterized the class of xed-path rationing methods by the following four axioms. First, a rule only selects e cient allocations. 6 Second, no agent can gain by misrepresenting his preference relation. Third, when some agents leave with their allotments, then the rule allocates the remaining amount to the agents who did not leave in the same way as before. Fourth, the amount assigned to each agent weakly increases whenever the collective endowment increases. Theorem 2.1 (Moulin, 1999) A rule satis es e ciency, strategy-proofness, consistency, and resource-monotonicity if and only if it is a x e d-path rationing method.
Proof of Su ciency
Throughout let ' bea rule satisfying the properties of Theorem 2.1. Lemma 3.2 ' is a xed-path method for f1 2g with f1 2g-paths g + (f1 2g) and g (f1 2g).
Proof. We o n l y p r o ve the lemma for the case of excess demand. The case of excess supply is symmetric. First, we s h o w that g + (f1 2g) i s a f1 2g-path. Feasibility follows from the de nition of ', and monotonicity from resource-monotonicity of '. Thus, g + (f1 2g) s a t i ses (a) and (b). Finally, w e s h o w for all (R ) 2 E f1 2g such t h a t p(R 1 ) + p(R 2 ), there exists 2 0 X f1 2g ] s u c h that 
8 Thomson (1994b, Proof of Theorem 2, Part (i) ) formally shows that if ' is e cient and resourcemonotonic, t h e n f o r a l l N N and all R 2 R N , '(R ) is continuous with respect to (and therefore g + 2 (f1 2g) is continuous with respect to ).
By consistency of ', ' i (R fi j g 0 ) = ' i (R ) and ' j (R fi jg 0 ) = ' j (R ). Now t h e previous fact combined with (2) and (3) contradicts resource-monotonicity of '.
